Tuesday, 14 April 2026

J. Sai Deepak’s Senseless Diatribe Against the Much-Maligned Charvaka

 


J. Sai Deepak’s Senseless Diatribe Against the Much-Maligned Charvaka

Shrikant G. Talageri 

 

Recently, I wrote an article on Anand Ranganathan (being interviewed about “Dhurandhar”) in which I stated that the three greatest Hindu intellectuals today are Anand Ranganathan, J. Sai Deepak and Vikram Sampath. I still stand by it, but someone just directed my attention to the video of a recent talk by J. Sai Deepak which was so incredibly fatuous and naïve that I was literally struck dumb. I still cannot believe that J. Sai Deepak said all these things. And I would really be very much interested in knowing whether Anand Ranganathan would agree with him in respect of what he says in this video (particularly about atheists, or those who do not believe in an “after life”, being “woke”):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOfkVM9Df3c


I wonder whether J. Sai Deepak really understands the meaning of words that he has used in the video, like Charvaka, atheism, Sanatana Dharma, wokism, etc. Almost everything he said in this video was so bizarre that I really began to wonder whether it was an AI-generated video, although common sense told me it was not.

In this video, J. Sai Deepak, after pointing out (correctly) that European culture is being completely destroyed by wokists, goes on to claim that Charvaka was the “woke-pati” of India responsible for the decline and fall of Hinduism/Indian-Culture.

Before going into the matter, let us first understand whatever little is known about Charvaka (though I took the information from Google AI overview for instant results, any other source will yield the same information, since that is basically all the information that is available):

Question Put to Google: “Aphorisms of Charvaka”.

Google AI Overview Reply:

The Charvaka school (or Lokāyata) is an ancient Indian materialistic and hedonistic philosophy that rejected the Vedas, afterlife, and supernaturalism, asserting that direct perception is the only source of knowledge. It posited that consciousness arises from matter and that human life should focus solely on maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain.

Key Aphorisms and Doctrines

·         "Live well, as long as you live. Live well even by borrowings, for, once cremated, there is no return." — Often quoted as the core hedonistic mantra, rejecting the concept of rebirth.

·         "While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt."

·         "There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world."

·         "Earth, water, fire, and air are the principles, nothing else." — Denying the existence of an immaterial soul.

·         "Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge." — Skepticism towards inference and scripture.

·         "The fire is hot, water cold... By whom came this variety? They are self-existent." — The world exists naturally, not by a divine creator.

·         "The only liberation is death." — (Maranameva mokshaha). 

Key Principles

·         Body is Life: Consciousness is an emergent property of the body, just as intoxication is produced by mixing ingredients (such as wine).

·         Anti-Ritualism: They argued that Vedic rituals (like sacrifice) were invented by cunning priests for their own livelihood, and offer no actual results.

·         Rejection of the Soul: When the body is burned, it is cut off, annihilated; nothing survives death. 

Note: Much of Charvaka philosophy is reconstructed from the works of opponents, as their original texts (like the Barhaspatya Sutras) were lost.

The above is a practically complete list of Charvaka’s doctrines; all, moreover, known, as correctly pointed out above, only through the works of opponents or followers of rival doctrines. In describing the evils of Islamic Imperialism and its (Islam’s) record in the destruction of temples, Sita Ram Goel has pointed out that the value of the evidence is all the more powerful because it comes from Islamic sources themselves, rather than from sources inimical to Islam. Likewise, that the condemnation of defeated peoples by the victors who defeated and destroyed them (including the strong indictments of Pagan religions and Native American religions by Christian Evangelist sources) is always to be taken with a heavy and cynical pinch of salt is a very basic doctrine in evaluating evidence for the purpose of passing judgment. Here, the criticisms of Sai Deepak are based exclusively on the quotes of critics and opponents.

 

But that i.e. alleging that the descriptions of Charvaka’s philosophy as described by its critics and opponents are necessarily biased and false (much of it is in fact reasonably correct) is not my main criticism of J. Sai Deepak’s condemnation of Charvaka, although that is also a factor to be taken into consideration in evaluating condemnation of anyone by anyone. My main criticism is that what J. Sai Deepak condemns about Charvaka (and his allegation that Charvaka represents the “Wokism” that was responsible for the decline and fall, and for the destruction, of India/Hinduism/Indian-Culture) seems to have no connection with the doctrines of Charvaka as known to anyone (see the full known doctrines given above), and Sai Deepak seems to have invented a new strawman-“Charvaka” having no connection whatsoever with the real Charvaka.

Firstly, what is wrong about “Wokism” is not that woke people do not unquestioningly accept as facts orthodox concepts of the afterlife and orthodox doctrines of God, karma, punarjanma, scriptural authority, etc. By that criterion people like Savarkar, Anand Ranganathan, and myself, besides literally countless others fighting for the Hindu Cause, would also be liable to be branded as at least as “woke” as Charvaka, and can equally be held (by Sai Deepak’s criterion) to be as much villains as, and in the same category as, the actual woke forces out to destroy Hinduism and Indian Culture.

It will be seen above that Charvaka’s doctrines (whether one likes them or not) merely delineate a particular philosophy of life, and a valid one at that, with no social activism of any kind involved anywhere. It is not for nothing that Charvaka’s doctrines are included in the Sarva-Darshana-Sangraha along with all the other philosophies of life prevalent in India in ancient times. Or that Charvaka is also classified as a muni (seer).

What is wrong with “Wokism” is not its philosophy in matters of the afterlife or in matters of ethics/morals, but its intrinsically destructive social activism, a central point of Woke ideology, which seeks to destroy the fundamental socio-cultural units and concepts of society, and seeks to actively block, stonewall and destroy people whose views are not palatable to them.

Not only is there no indication of any kind anywhere, directly or indirectly, that followers of Charvaka’s philosophy indulged in any kind of social activism directed against those not believing in their doctrines trying to block, stonewall, destroy, isolate, boycott, expel, etc. anyone but in fact there is direct evidence in many places that it is believers in the orthodox doctrines of God, karma, punarjanma, scriptural authority, etc. who believed in doing all these things to the real or believed-to-be followers of Charvaka’s philosophy.

In the Valmiki Ramayana, for example, in Ayodhya Kanda 109, we have the following words put in the mouth of Rama: “Those who preach the heretical doctrine of the Charvaka school, are not only infidels, but have deviated from the path of truth. It is the duty of a monarch to deal with such persons as with felons, nor should men of understanding and learning stand in the presence of such atheists”. An additional quote, considered to be an interpolation (obviously since the Buddha does not precede Rama in time and cannot have been known in the actual time of Rama), also says: “It is a well-known fact that a follower of Buddha deserves to be punished precisely in the same way as a thief, and know an unbeliever to be on par with a Bauddha, and these should be punished in the interest of the people, and a wise man should shun them”. Regardless of which quotes are “original” and which “interpolated”, it must be noted that the “woke” attitude of targeting and persecuting people with different views is not derived from Charvaka but from the doctrines of practically any religion. In that sense, Wokism is practically a religion in itself!    

Clearly, classifying Charvaka as “woke” is the height of incongruity.

Secondly, even if one assumes (totally against the data and evidence) that the doctrines of Charvaka were capable of “woke”-like interpretation, leading to the destruction of society and culture, what was the actual reach of these doctrines?

Right from the time of the eponymous Charvaka (whatever his date) till the present day, it is doubtful whether at any point of time even .01 per cent of the population of India were ever aware even of his name, and much less of his doctrines; and not even a minuscule number even among these people may ever have been “influenced” by his views. And certainly there is not even a grain of possibility in the idea that his views influenced India to such an extent that it could have led to the destruction of Indian culture (as alleged by Sai Deepak). Nor is there the slightest evidence to show that the doctrines of Charvaka led to the foundation of a sect which propagated his views. In fact, if not for its description in the Sarva Darshana Sangraha, and mentions in the form of stray references in other ancient texts, the philosophical viewpoint of Charvaka would not even have been known to ever have existed.

The allegation that Charvaka was the cause of the destruction of Indian culture therefore has an eerie aura of unreality.

Thirdly, what exactly is there in the doctrines of Charvaka that is so dangerous to society or culture? Read all the doctrines as detailed above. Nowhere is there the slightest incitement to physical, mental or social violence; there is no advocacy of robbing, killing or even hating anyone; and nor is there any incitement against family values or society. In fact, he does not even advocate drinking or gambling or any other standard vice. In fact he is not even unorthodox enough to specifically advocate meat-eating.

Yes, certain of the doctrines seem to show a rather cavalier and irresponsible attitude towards certain basic principles of a decently sensible way of living: e.g. “Live well, as long as you live. Live well even by borrowings, for, once cremated, there is no return”, or “let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt”. But then this kind of attitude prevails, and has prevailed, among sizable sections of human society in every time and clime. It can be nobody’s claim that people read this doctrine of Charvaka’s and then, under its influence, decided to live a life of debt and profligate spending. So Charvaka cannot be held responsible even for this trend among any Hindus.

On the other hand, the basic principle of Charvaka’s teaching, “human life should focus solely on maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain” is probably more fundamental for the betterment of any society than the basic principle of any religion. This statement is not elaborated by adding “even if, in the process you reduce the pleasure of other people and cause pain to others”. It is simply a standalone statement, proclaiming a fundamental truth, and after all it is not wrong in itself from any point of view (except a sadistic-masochistic one) for a human being to want to “focus solely on maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain” and in fact the principle can be logically expanded as follows: “human life should focus solely on maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain for one’s own self as well as for others and for humankind in general”. Can there be a better principle for improving the world and making it a better place for everyone? Any religion, on the other hand, has its own system of classifying human acts (or even ideas, ways of life, or particular views of “God” or “afterlife”, or particular forms of worship)  as “good” or “bad” and no two religions coincide in their views on these matters and then every religion goes further by proclaiming “consequences” (ranging from a permanent “hell” full of tortures, to “reincarnation” into lives full of tortures) for those who fail to follow these rules in their behavior.

In comparison, the principle (as elaborated above) “human life should focus solely on maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain for one’s own self as well as for others and for humankind in general” is faultless.

 

But in the video, Sai Deepak expresses his criticism for Charvaka (or rather for the strawman-Charvaka of his own creation) in many more ways, not one of which makes any sense.

For example he tells us (using the usual criticism against atheism) that Carvaka and (one assumes) his “followers” were responsible for the decline and fall of India and the destruction of Indian culture because “they had no faith in the concept of karma. They had no faith in the consequences of an action. If consequences of an action don’t matter, then what is good and what is bad? What is justice and what is injustice? Everything is same. So they believe even today that there is no life after life. And therefore there is no concept of a soul. What you see is everything. The two consequences are: it first kills the central unit, the family structure. It normalizes all kinds of behavior and says everything is correct. That means garbage and gold are both the same. That means the power of vivek is completely eliminated, since what is the need for vivek if everything is the same. Once the family unit is destroyed, how will society survive? And after that, what do you fight for?

Please see, above, the aphorisms of Charvaka as recorded (by third parties): where do you see a single word attacking the family unit, or saying there is no such thing as “good” and “bad” (Charvaka simply refrains, unlike the teachings of simply any religion, from imposing his views in the matter of what is “good” and what is “bad”) or that there is no such thing as “justice” and “injustice”, or that “all kinds of behavior” (except for advocating enjoying life even by falling into debt) are “correct”, or that one’s vivekabuddhi should be eliminated?

Charvaka only and simply rejects the philosophical idea of an afterlife, he does not advocate that this should stunt or distort our ideas of good and bad or justice and injustice in living this one life.

The idea, suggested by Sai Deepak, that not believing in an afterlife automatically frees a person from any responsible idea of good and bad, or justice and injustice, and leads that person into a life of sin or of uncivic or unethical behavior, is an idea found among the most naïve and unintellectual proponents of religion, and does not behove a really erudite and highly intelligent person like Sai Deepak. For starters, Richard Dawkins’ book “The God Delusion” deals absolutely thoroughly with this ridiculous idea. The utter untenability of the idea, that religious people are necessarily more moral, ethical, good and just than people who don’t believe in religious ideas, should be so clear to anyone, even to a child, that I cannot find any justification for a person of Sai Deepak’s intellectual caliber resorting to this cliché-ridden view.

[At this point, let me make clear that if my defense of atheism leads anyone to believe I am an atheist, he will be wrong. In fact, the words theist and atheist are themselves fundamentally wrong: the correct words should be astik, nāstik, and ajñāstik. By this, I don’t mean we should use the Sanskrit words rather than the English ones: actual English, or any other language, words directly equivalent in meaning to the Sanskrit words would be equally correct. I will deal with this division in the appendix].

As to Charvaka’s doctrines “killing” or “destroying” the family unit: there is no indication at all as to the attitude advocated by Charvaka towards family and family life. He neither advocates celibacy nor sexual profligacy, and nor does he advocate misogyny either. He is silent on all these matters, and his doctrines (even if they be considered likely to influence society) are therefore less liable to destroy the family unit or family life than the religious doctrines of almost every religion known to us. Every religion, in some manner or the other, and to some extent or the other, directly allows, and sometimes even enforces, social systems and rules which oppress certain sections within the family (usually the female members in the family). A person could even argue that all the monastic sects of the world (Buddhism, Jainism, Catholicism, numerous Hindu Brahmachari sects and orders, etc., not only in the matter of not marrying, but often also in the matter of leading to the breaking of all ties with the family of birth) “destroy” the sanctity of the family and family life. Almost every religion advocates (to different extents) the breaking or loosening or discarding of ties with, or even hostility towards, family members not following certain religious rules or customs.

So how is Charvaka responsible for “killing” or “destroying” the family unit in the first place, and then for doing this to such an extent that Indian culture itself got destroyed as a result?   

Going on further, Sai Deepak tells us: “Don’t treat every Khajuraho painting as an achievement of your civilization. It could have been created during the patansheelata (downfall phase) of your civilization because of woke people of that period”! Now, one can either appreciate all aspects of Indian culture, or one can express reservations about certain aspects which go against one’s ideas of orthodoxy or propriety or decency. But is it logical to just decide that people who held/hold views or attitudes of certain kinds, which you do not share or agree with, were “woke” people? This seems to be an untenable free-for-all use of the word “woke” as a label for anything one does not like. In fact, even as he admits, again, that “we don’t know what they were at that time”, he repeats the charge that “they could have been the woke people of that period”!

After labeling everything, from “destroying the family unit” to (as I see the meaning of his words) “creating vulgarly erotic art” to “woke” people of ancient India inspired by Charvaka, Sai Deepak concludes: “So, Charavakaism is bad, in whichever form, and it is now on the rise in Bharat once more, when we should be looking at the rise of Sanatana Dharma”!

He then adds: “Nowadays it is even being said that Charvaka was a Hindu. Yes, he may have been a Hindu but he cannot have been a Sanatani”, and goes on to declare that people who say they are atheist Hindus, “whatever this vichitra creature is”, are free to “please go ahead and believe that but just spare Sanatana Dharma of your nonsense. We have suffered enough already. We don’t need this New Age nonsense to infect us once more. It is self-created by us. India did not suffer as much from Islamic invasions as it did from Charvaka nonsense from within. You have a response to an outer enemy since he is clearly from the outside, so you can see who is an insider and who is an outsider, But if an insider infects this “Trojan (horse)” from inside ,….”.

He goes on to diversify into new fields by explaining that it is western strategy to “remove religion, spirituality and consciousness and family structures and society structures from the community altogether and make them dependent on corporations and governments. Because corporations want a wider consumer base and governments want a wider voter base….” and concludes by asking Hindus to become free of the influence of corporations and governments. I personally would have agreed with all of this part, if it had not been presented as a continuation of all the preceding stuff.

 

Let us see again all the implications of this talk by J. Sai Deepak:

1. He firstly picks Charvaka as the fall guy to be blamed for all the ills of Indian history and society, and attributes all kinds of things to him which are completely missing in all the known records of the doctrines and aphorisms of Charvaka. And it is difficult to even start to guess where he gets all his data from: is he in possession of some secret documents of Charvaka’s teachings totally unknown to the whole rest of the world perhaps some kind of “Protocols of the Elders of Charvakaism”?

2. He then gives totally new meanings to the word “woke”, attributing all the ills of Indian society to Charvaka, whom he calls the “woke-pati” of India responsible for the decline and fall of Hinduism/Indian-Culture, even when Charvakaism and Wokism are as different from each other as chalk and cheese.

Then he proceeds to classify whole segments of people such as the artisans who carved the erotic sculptures of Khajuraho, as “woke”, and directly attributes all these woke activities to the influence of Charvakaism.

Incidentally, by his definition of “woke” as people who do not believe absolutely in the idea of “life after life” (i.e. karma, punarjanma, etc.), he indicts large sections of those fighting for Hinduism as “wokes” and “Charvakaists”, and specifically states that “India did not suffer as much from Islamic invasions as it did from Charvaka nonsense from within”. In short, though he does not specifically name them, people like Savarkar and Anand Ranganathan (and, incidentally myself, apart, of course, from the sculptors of Khajuraho) are more dangerous than Islamic activists, and are in fact “Trojan horses”.

3. Throughout the talk, he keeps drawing a distinction between a Hindu and a Sanatani (to use his own words, “whatever this vichitra creature is”), and tells us that Charvakamay have been a Hindu but he cannot have been a Sanatani”, as if being a Hindu is irrelevant but being a Sanatani is important. He asks people who call themselves atheist Hindus to “just spare Sanatana Dharma of your nonsense. We have suffered enough already. We don’t need this New Age nonsense to infect us once more. It is self-created by us”.

The word Hindu has been used, directly or indirectly, right from the period of the Greek and Persian invasions BCE. It is now many centuries since it has been accepted by all Hindus as the most appropriate word to describe members of our Indic civilization (Indic ultimately having the same root in the Rigveda as Hindu). and atheist Hindus have been part of this definition since time immemorial.

On the other hand, Sanatana Dharma and Sanatani are words which have been used only since the last century or two to describe ourselves, and I have already written an article on this subject, where I wrote “All these words (Sanātanī, Ārya, etc) produced out of an inexplicable allergy for the word "Hindu" and as substitutes for it, were nothing but ill-thought-out pseudo-nationalistic reactions to colonial rule and scholarship, and do not in any way reflect our own self-description in the same way as the word Hindu”:

https://talageri.blogspot.com/2024/04/hindu-dharma-or-sanatana-dharma.html 

So anyone can judge which are the words and concepts which represent “New Age nonsense …. self-created by us”.   

4. Unfortunately, the whole point of the talk seems to be to carry out a Grand Inquisition to decide who are “Sanatanis” (since the word Hindu does not matter): people who do not believe in a “life after life” are, according to the talk, wokes and Charvakaists, and cannot be classified as “Sanatanis”, and are more dangerous for Indian culture and society than even the Islamic invaders. and are in fact insider enemies and Trojan horses.

Many Hindu thinkers have been “infected” by this Abrahamic idea of semantically expelling sections of Hindus from the definition of “Hindu” solely on the basis of what religious concepts they believe in. Tilak had also set up similar criteria to determine who is a Hindu: his primary criterion being a belief in the supremacy of the Vedas. By his definition, not only Buddhists and Jains, but vast sections of even the writers of our ancient Hindu scriptures were outside the definition.

One of the aphorisms of Charvaka (see above) is “Anti-Ritualism: They argued that Vedic rituals (like sacrifice) were invented by cunning priests for their own livelihood, and offer no actual results”. But does this mean Charvaka or atheists are not Hindu? As I have pointed out in an earlier article, acceptance or rejection of religious concepts, and even criticism of actual scriptures (even the Vedas), was a common and perfectly legitimate practice in ancient India. If we expel all these ancient writers of Hindu texts from the definition of who is a Hindu (I genuinely do not care for the New Age word Sanatani) on the basis of Abrahamic-type criteria, we will be left with little of our heritage to call our own.

My article referred to above:

https://talageri.blogspot.com/2021/12/apologetics-in-guise-of-hindu-response.html

In conclusion: We cannot classify sections of Hindus as “internal enemies” within the Hindu fold on the basis of their religious beliefs or their ideas of the afterlife, but only on the basis of their actual hostile attitudes and activity against Hindus, Hinduism and Indian Culture, and their collaboration with the Breaking India Forces.

 

 

APPENDIX: ASTIK, NĀSTIK, AND AJÑĀSTIK:

There is a general tendency to classify religious beliefs into two main categories: theist and atheist, and the third natural point of the triangle, agnostic.

Richard Dawkins, in his book “The God Delusion”, in a section titled “The Poverty of Agnosticism” (pages 46-53) has the following harsh words to say (or at least to quote committed theists saying) about those who claim to be agnostics, and I append quotations from it below for those interested, before continuing my points:  “The robust Muscular Christian haranguing us from the pulpit of my old school chapel admitted a sneaking regard for atheists. They at least had the courage of their misguided convictions. What this preacher couldn't stand was agnostics: namby-pamby, mushy pap, weak-tea, weedy, pallid fence-sitters. …... In the same vein, according to Quentin de la Bedoyere, the Catholic historian Hugh Ross Williamson 'respected the committed religious believer and also the committed atheist. He reserved his contempt for the wishy-washy boneless mediocrities who flapped around in the middle.'

The theists were right to a certain extent: an average normal person, who has not thought deeply on the question of whether or not there is an eternal “God” who created everything and rewards and punishes people for their actions, would certainly be either a theist (firmly believing), an atheist (firmly non-believing), or to different degrees (classified by Dawkins in this section) not sure of himself but inclined to either this side or that: in short, an agnostic.

[Note: this “God” may be Jehovah of the Bible, Allah of the Quran, Ahura Mazda of the Avesta, or any of the supreme Hindu Gods or Goddesses (Vishnu, Shiva, Devi, etc.) or the Gods of any other ancient culture: Greek, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Mexican, or whatever)].

But when it comes to an intelligent thinker, this kind of ambiguous “maybe-or-may-not-be” agnostic attitude would indeed be symptomatic of diplomatic behavior, or lack of courage to put forward a definite opinion, or disinclination to think deeply on such esoteric matters.

Dawkins gives instances of cases where a thinker would be absolutely justified in being agnostic:

Carl Sagan was proud to be agnostic when asked whether there was life elsewhere in the universe. When he refused to commit himself, his interlocutor pressed him for a 'gut feeling' and he immortally replied: 'But I try not to think with my gut. Really, it's okay to reserve judgment until the evidence is in.'

The question of extra-terrestrial life is open. Good arguments can be mounted both ways, and we lack the evidence to do more than shade the probabilities one way or the other. Agnosticism, of a kind, is an appropriate stance on many scientific questions, such as what caused the end-Permian extinction, the greatest mass extinction in fossil history. It could have been a meteorite strike like the one that, with greater likelihood on present evidence, caused the later extinction of the dinosaurs. But it could have been any of various other possible causes, or a combination. Agnosticism about the causes of both these mass extinctions is reasonable”.

Dawkins therefore distinguishes two types of agnosticism:

How about the question of God? Should we be agnostic about him too? Many have said definitely yes, often with an air of conviction that verges on protesting too much. Are they right?

I'll begin by distinguishing two kinds of agnosticism. TAP, or Temporary Agnosticism in Practice, is the legitimate fence-sitting where there really is a  definite answer, one way or the other, but we so far lack the evidence to reach it (or don't understand the evidence, or haven't time to read the evidence, etc.). TAP would be a reasonable stance towards the Permian extinction. There is a truth out there and one day we hope to know it, though for the moment we don't.

But there is also a deeply inescapable kind of fence-sitting, which I shall call PAP (Permanent Agnosticism in Principle). The fact that the acronym spells a word used by that old school preacher is (almost) accidental. The PAP style of agnosticism is appropriate for questions that can never be answered, no matter how much evidence we gather, because the very idea of evidence is not applicable. The question exists on a different plane, or in a different dimension, beyond the zones where evidence can reach. An example might be that philosophical chestnut, the question whether you see red as I do. Maybe your red is my green, or something completely different from any colour that I can imagine. Philosophers cite this question as one that can never be answered, no matter what new evidence might one day become available. And some scientists and other intellectuals are convinced - too eagerly in my view - that the question of God's existence belongs in the forever inaccessible PAP category. From this, as we shall see, they often make the illogical deduction that the hypothesis of God's existence, and the hypothesis of his non-existence, have exactly equal probability of being right. The view that I shall defend is very different: agnosticism about the existence of God belongs firmly in the temporary or TAP category. Either he exists or he doesn't. It is a scientific question; one day we may know the answer, and meanwhile we can say something pretty strong about the probability.

In short, Dawkins insists that there can be no “agnosticism’ about whether “God” exists or not: the answer either has to be “yes” or “no, and his own answer is a definite “no”. So, incidentally, is mine. Does this mean I am an “atheist”? But then a Christian who believes in a “God” who sends to a permanent Heaven people who believe in Jesus, (and to a permanent Hell a person who doesn’t), a Muslim who believes in an “Allah” who sends to a permanent Heaven people who believe in Mohammad, (and to a permanent Hell a person who doesn’t), and a Hindu who believes in anyGod” who rewards and punishes (regardless of what one believes in) on the basis of a law of karma and by way of punarjanma, are all three “theists” in respect of each his own particular beliefs but “atheists” in respect of the beliefs of the other two. So no-one could be a full “theist”. I myself, like Dawkins would be classifiable as an “atheist” in all three cases

So the basic question cannot be about “theism” in general, since it becomes a very muddled and item-specific issue. the question of the existence of “God” (with very specific characteristics) is basically in the same category as that of what Dawkins calls “Bertrand Russell's parable of the celestial teapot”:

Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school,

hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.

We would not waste time saying so because nobody, so far as I know, worships teapots; but, if pressed, we would not hesitate to declare our strong belief that there is positively no orbiting teapot.

Yet strictly we should all be teapot agnostics: we cannot prove, for sure, that there is no celestial teapot. In practice, we move away from teapot agnosticism towards a-teapotism.

 

Like “Russel’s teapot”, any “God” with a specific name, cultural identity, history, chain of command, and rules and regulations and beliefs to be followed by his believers, will have his band of “theist’ followers, but the “atheists” in the case of this “God” would not only include all-round atheists, but also those who would be “theists” in respect of some other “God” (with a different specific name, cultural identity, history, chain of command, and rules and regulations and beliefs to be followed by his believers).

[Of course, let me clarify that this will be so only for staunch followers of rigid Abrahamic religions: a Christian will not believe in Allah, Ram or Zeus, and a Muslim will not believe in the Ram, Zeus, or the Jehovah of Christianity, but the followers of most Pagan religions, including Hinduism, would be inclined to regard the “Gods” of all other religions to be just other forms of their own God, rejecting only the idea that they themselves will be heading towards Hell for also believing in their own “Gods”].

So, as Dawkins points out, being “agnostic” in respect of any particular “God” or of a Universal “God” (with a specific name, cultural identity, history, chain of command, and rules and regulations and beliefs to be followed by his believers) is not possible.

This is because the terms used are themselves wrong: “theist” refers to someone who believes in “God”: this may be, as mentioned above, a particularGod” or a UniversalGod”, but then there are systems of belief which can function without an all-powerful “God”. Even the concept of a relentless law of karma where action begets consequences, and where no “God” can tweak the law by allowing anyone to escape the consequences of actions, will not be classifiable as “theism” because the law of karma would be higher than that “God”.

The true classification should be based on “is there anything beyond this life?” and the terms should be “astik” (one who believes there is existence beyond this life), “nāstik” (one who believes there is no existence beyond this life), and  ajñāstik” (one who frankly does not know whether or not there is any existence beyond this life, and sees no possibility of ever knowing, since, apart from stories in religious myths and superstitious beliefs, and horror-stories, no-one has ever really come back after death to testify to anything). This is true agnosticism, about which Dawkins writes: “The PAP style of agnosticism is appropriate for questions that can never be answered, no matter how much evidence we gather, because the very idea of evidence is not applicable. The question exists on a different plane, or in a different dimension, beyond the zones where evidence can reach. 

This true agnosticism (the third point in this triangle of astik, nāstik and ajñāstik) is found in Hindu texts long before any mention of karma or punarjanma, and is therefore at least as Hindu as the astik ideas of karma or punarjanma. which Sai Deepak takes as the only true form of what he calls “Sanatan Dharma”. 

In my article “Are Indian Tribals Hindus?”, I had written the following:

“The fact is, Hinduism can never be in true conflict with any other religion (other than the two predator Abrahamic religions which themselves choose conflict with all other religions) since it has no particular God, Ritual or Dogma to impose on the followers of other religions. In itself, Hinduism contains the seeds of every kind of philosophy, and is comfortable with all streams of thought, and not necessarily to do with the worship of “Gods”. In Hinduism, we find all kinds of atheistic and materialistic philosophies, the most well known being the Lokayata philosophy of Charvaka, who believed that there is only one life, that there is no such thing as an afterlife, or heaven or hell, or rebirth, and that our only purpose in life should be to maximize our pleasures and minimize our pains. The very basic texts of Hinduism contain the seeds and roots of agnostic philosophies, from the Rigvedic NasadiyaSukta (X.129. 6-7, which says: “Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it was born and whence comes this creation? The Gods are later than this world's production. Who knows then whence it first came into being? He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it? He whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not.”) to the Upanishadic speculations which reject everything, after deep discussion, with the phrase “neti, neti”: “not this, not this”, i.e., “no, this is still not the ultimate truth. And then of course, there is every kind of deistichenotheisticpantheisticpolytheistic, and every other kind of  theistic philosophy, including even (but not exclusively) monotheistic philosophy (minus the hatred of “other” false religions and false Gods, and the concepts of permanent Heaven for believers and Hell for non-believers, characteristic of Abrahamic monotheism)”.

This appendix, it should be emphasized, was more in order to explain the concept of true agnosticism in its true perspective rather than to deal with Sai Deepak’s talk, which concluded just before this appendix.     

       


Thursday, 9 April 2026

A Review of a Review (by Swami Narasimhananda) of the Rigveda as Translated by Jamison and Brereton

 

A Review of a Review (by Swami Narasimhananda) of the Rigveda as Translated by Jamison and Brereton

Shrikant G Talageri 

 

I just received (from academia.edu.in) a copy of a very short review of the famous and now most widely acclaimed translation of the Rigveda by Stephanie W. Jamison and Joel P. Brereton. It is a very short review, hardly two pages, by Swami Narasimhananda, editor of Prabuddha Bharata, so I would not have thought it necessary to pay any critical attention to the translation were it not that, within this short space, it resorts to some degree of “Griffith-bashing” in its zeal to present the Jamison-Brereton volume as a brilliant exercise by contrast:

https://www.academia.edu/37565589/Review_of_The_Rigveda_3_Volumes_by_Stephanie_W_Jamison_and_Joel_P_Brereton_Reading_Religion_May_2018?email_work_card=title

To translate the Rig Veda into English requires great patience and great scholarship. Stephanie W. Jamison and Joel P. Brereton have successfully achieved this mammoth task. The earlier English translation of Rig Veda by Ralph T. H. Griffith was done without taking into account the innumerable nuances of the tradition within which the Vedas originated. Jamison and Brereton make it clear that Griffith’s translation “conceals rather than reveals the wonders” of the RigVeda (1.3)”.

The point is that while the reviewer does seem to point to some shortcomings (though mainly or solely consisting of what more could have been given in the volumes rather than what is wrong in the translations as they are given) in Jamison-Brereton’s work, it ends this exercise in a show of awestruck respect for the work in sharp contrast to the contempt shown for Griffith:

It would have been better if the reader was given a more annotated translation alongside this “imaginative” one, as it would have helped to make better sense of the translation. But just as the original text has been dropped because of the obvious reason of length, annotations also could not be given. The translators have refrained from giving explanatory notes and point their readers to the copious notes in the German translation done by Karl Friedrich Geldner in 1951. While the language of Jamison and Brereton’s translation is brief and poetic for the most part, it fails to convey sense to the modern reader. Probably this compelled the translators to give annotations and commentary and make them available online for the benefit of the reader. This is still a work in progress. The reader is completely awestruck when going through this online

Yes, I accept that, whether the translation of the Rigveda by any particular translator is right or wrong, it is certainly a matter to make the reader awestruck by the great labor and intensive study which must have been made by the translator in executing the monumental task. But this should have left the reviewer to feel even more awestruck by the work of Griffith (or of Wilson, both of whom were the only persons perhaps to carry out English translations of the entire text of the Rigveda in the late 19th century, well more than a century before Jamison-Brereton). They did it when there were no complete translations available before them for them to consult or compare, and when there were no sweeping computer techniques available for them to make use of in their translations.

But then not only is it surprising that the reviewer feels so contemptuous of Griffith’s translation, but even more that he seems to see no faults in the Jamison-Brereton translations. Whatever he praises in the Jamison-Brereton translation is equally present in Griffith’s translation, e.g. “Scholarship on the Rig Veda and the various extant English translations are discussed in here.” Although Griffith had no translations of the full Rigveda to discuss (since only Wilson had done it slightly before him), he does discuss in his footnotes all those points where earlier partial-translators, analysts and commentators on the Rigveda sharply differed from himself in their translations. Which is why so many very significant historical points (the name of Kavi Cāyamāna, the participants in the dāśarājña battle, etc. for example) come to light in the translations of various schoilars, which would have remained hidden if he had not presented those details.

I have pointed out in some detail in earlier articles both, why Griffith has my respect, as well as the faults in Jamison-Brereton’s translation. I will not give the URLs of those articles here. I will directly give the relevant material in appendices below.

It is unfortunate that a Swami who is editor of Prabuddha Bharata should adopt such a blind attitude of praise for Jamison-Brereton and contempt for Griffith.

 

 

APPENDIX I: GRIFFITH: 

II. A Tribute to a very great Indologist: Ralph T. H. Griffith

Griffith is regularly derided by Hindu scholars for his AIT outlook, but he is also derided by western scholars.

In his vicious critique “WESTWARD HO! The Incredible Wanderlust of the Rgvedic Tribes Exposed by S. Talageri” of my second book “The Rigveda – A Historical Analysis”, Michael Witzel wrote that I rely “throughout on Griffith’s outdated Victorian translation (1889), which even in its own day was aimed at a popular (and not scholarly) audience” (WITZEL 2001b:Summary), and, naturally, “depending totally on” (WITZEL 2001b:Edit), and “blindly using, any translation – let alone one as inadequate as Griffith’s – can easily lead one astray” (WITZEL 2001b:§3)."

In a more recent issue of Witzel's internet journal JIES, Stefan Zimmer reviews the recent English translation of the Rigveda by Stephanie Jamison, and declares it to be "the first complete Rigveda [,,,] in English […] which may be taken serious by the scholarly world", and takes a swipe at Griffith: "only two complete translations of the Rigveda have been published in the past, viz. by Horace H. Wilson (1850-57, with reprints) and Ralph T.H. Griffith (1889-92, with revised later reprints). Both have been deservedly blamed for being philologically unreliable even in their own times, and both, consequently, played no role at all in subsequent Indological studies" (ZIMMER 2015:477).

Incredible but true: no "scholar" was able to translate the whole Rigveda into English in the course of 123 years between 1892 to 2015, and this is the disrespectful way in which the western scholars treat the two great pioneering scholars who did the job on their own in the earliest days.

Of course, just because they were the earliest they do not merit compulsory praise, but was their work really so bad as to deserve this condemnation? Obviously, the "scholarly audience" that Witzel refers to above did not find Griffith's (or Wilson's) translation sufficient to prove their agenda: his AIT interpretations do not usually appear in his actual translations (whether correct or incorrect), which are more objective, but in his footnotes, which provide the subjective note.

Griffith's translation definitely has its limits and faults. The language and style are Victorian, as also his moral inhibitions: he omits translating certain hymns and verses into English in the main body of his work, for their erotic content, and puts them in a separate appendix at the end of the book but translated into Latin (not meant for the "popular" audience but only for the "scholarly audience"). Moreover, his ill-advised use of Roman numerals for the hymn-numbers, and detachment of the Vālakhilya hymns from the middle of Book 8 and placing them in an appendix to Book 8 (changing the hymn-numbers of the hymns in Book 8 in the process), also add to the confusion.

But the great advantage of his translation is that, in spite of the countless mistakes made by him (because of the AIT blinkers worn by him), it gives us a greater insight into the Rigveda than any single translation by any other scholar. He has not only studied all the studies and partial translations of the Rigveda till his time (he mentions in his preface the works of Ludwig, Peterson, Müller, Wilson, Grassmann, Weber, Oldenberg, Bergaigne, Wallis, Kaegi, Monier-Williams, Goldstücker, Benfey, Muir, Roth, Cowell, Geldner, Colebrooke, etc.), but more important, he often points out the differences in their interpretations in the footnotes when his own translations differ: no other scholar does this to the same extent and in the same manner (including the Geldner and Jamison praised by Witzel and Zimmer when condemning Griffith), and therefore all other translations, even the best of them, give us limited perspectives (the views of only the single translator) on the actual verses being translated.

Thus, for example, he correctly translates VII.18.7 as "Together came the Pakthas, the Bhalānas, the Alinas, the Śivas and the Viṣāṇins", but in the footnotes points out Wilson's literalistic translation as "Those who dress the oblations, those who pronounce auspicious words, those who abstain from penance, those who bear horns (in their hands), those who bestow happiness (on the world by sacrifice)".

He incorrectly translates VII.18.8 as "Lord of the earth, he with his might repressed them: still lay the herd and the affrighted herdsman", but in the footnotes mentions Wilson's more accurate translation: "But he by his greatness pervades the earth, Kavi, the son of Chayamāna, like a falling victim, sleeps (in death)".

He incorrectly translates VII.83.1 as "armed with broad axes" and in the footnotes he not only gives Wilson's translation as "armed with large sickles", but, more important, notes: "Professor Ludwig notes that the former meaning is perfectly impossible, and argues that pṛthuparśavah must mean 'the Pṛthus and the Parśus'".

Many such instances can be produced, The Rigveda is a difficult text to translate, and the translation of a single scholar cannot reveal the full or correct picture. Griffith's work is therefore of great utility in understanding many contradictory translations, or even in understanding that there are indeed contradictory translations.

Incidentally, in condemning Griffith, both Witzel and Stefan Zimmer praise the German translation of Geldner (apart from the latest English translation of Jamison):

"the far more accurate scholarly translations made by K.F. Geldner (1951, German)…" (WITZEL 2001b:§3)

"up to now the standard translation into any language was Karl F. Geldner's German one, published in 1951 by the American Oriental Society, already written in the beginning of the century. An excellent work by the great Avestan and Vedic scholar, constantly consulted by everybody, much admired for its ample philological notes…" (ZIMMER 2015:478).

But note:

1. Jamison for example, translates the three verses referred to above as follows:

VII.18.7: "The Pakthas ["cooked oblations"?] and the Bhalānases ["raiders"?], spoke out, and the Alinas, the Viṣānins and the Śivas".

VII.18.8: "With his greatness he [Indra? Turvaṣa?] enveloped the earth, being master of it. The poet lay there, being perceived as (just) a (sacrificial) animal".

VII.83.1: "the broad-chested ones".

Note that Jamison's translation of VII.18.7 alternately translates Pakthas and Bhalānases as names or literal phrases, and the other three words only as names, creating a non-existent division in the five names (unlike Griffith, who consistently treats all five as names, and Wilson, who treats all five as literal phrases).

And her translations of VII.18.8 and VII.83.1 camouflage all the names in the form of literal phrases. Without Griffith (and Wilson in the first case) would the reader even have known that the concerned verses contain names?

This is why I give tribute to Griffith as a truly great Indological scholar. Even where he was wrong most of the time, it was not because of ideology or insincerity, but because of the AIT blinkers which were worn by him as a scholar of his time. And a study of his translations (and footnotes) is indispensable.

2. Further, the endorsement of Geldner while condemning Griffith, by both Witzel and Stefan Zimmer (I mention his name Stefan, since there was also an earlier Zimmer referred to by Griffith) is not very consistent when they find Geldner's translations inconvenient to their AIT interpretations.

Thus, the word ibha in the Rigveda is variously translated by Griffith as "servant/attendant" in IV.4.1 and VI.20.8, and as "household" in I.84.17. Geldner correctly translates the word as "elephant" in IV.4.1 and I.84.17, and leaves it untranslated as ibha in VI.20.8.

In this case, needless to say, Witzel and Stefan Zimmer would find Griffith's translations to be "scholarly" or "far more accurate scholarly translations", and would reject Geldner's as "inadequate" and "philologically unreliable".

Such is the hypocrisy of modern western Indological "scholars". And so much is the value you can place on their praise and condemnation of early Indologists.

 

As for the criticism that my analysis of the Rigveda solely "relies on" or is "based on" Griffith's translation:

Not one single person, neither Witzel who initially made this claim, nor the numerous brainless moronic clods on the internet who frequently repeat his words, can point out a single instance where I have "relied on", or "based" my analysis on, Griffith's translations and consequently have been led into any conclusions. That I have given a detailed critique of Griffith's translations in my second book (TALAGERI 2000:339-343) is not even worth mentioning in this regard.

Therefore and nevertheless, I pay my tributes to this great Indologist (as I already paid tribute in my books to Edward Hopkins, another great Indologist). However many mistakes these two particular Indologists, and many others, may have made — and, after all, human beings do make mistakes — they are not fools or villains, but great scholars who deserve respect.

 

APPENDIX II: JAMISON-BRERETON: 

An Incredibly Blatant Mistranslation in Jamison's translations of the Rigveda

Shrikant G,. Talageri 

The English translation of the Rigveda by Stephanie W. Jamison and Joel P. Brereton, "The Rigveda - The Earliest Religious Poetry of India" (Univ. of Texas South Asia Institute, and Oxford University Press, 2017) is now regularly put forward as the most standard, in fact the latest and most deeply researched, translation of the Rigveda into the English language.

As I have been studying the Rigveda, based on earlier translations and studies, but even more pertinently on the basis of the primary sources (the text itself and various Rigvedic grammar texts and Word Concordances, etc.) since more than twenty years now, it was never necessary for me to examine this new translation in great depth, and indeed I always generally assumed that it could be that her translations were more accurate in many ways than earlier ones since she had the benefit of studying those before she undertook her own work, although I have always found the contemptuously critical attitude that not only Indian opponents of the AIT but even AIT warriors like Witzel have towards earlier translations (such as that of Griffith) to be totally subjective, unreasonable and pompous "armchair" criticism.

The only thing I had noticed, from the incidental examination of her translations, was that she, like some other western academicians who write on Indian texts, seemed to love to indulge in dirty talk (like small children who feel thrilled when they use "dirty words"), and many of her translations of verses are not just outright vulgar in meaning but even the terms used indicate a rather deliberately selected sleazy street lingo style. However, this would be a rather subjective assessment of her writing, and perhaps particularly notable only because it stands in sharp contrast to the translations of earlier "Victorian" translators like Griffith who chose not to translate certain erotic hymns and verses into English in the main body of his work, but gave the Latin translations (meant only for the scholars and not for the pedestrian readers) in an appendix. But I still assumed that her work must in general (though of course strictly within the blinkers-restricted AIT paradigm) be sincere otherwise.

Which is why I got a shock today when a reader on the subject brought to my notice the fact that her book contains certain deliberate and motivated mistranslations calculated to misdirect and sabotage genuine historical inquiry into Rigvedic history. Apparently, her translations contain references to "spoked wheels" where no such references exist in the text.

To go straight to the point, the Rigveda refers to ara, "spokes" in the following verses:

I. 32.15; 141.9; 164.11-13

V. 13.6; 58.5.

VIII. 20.14; 77.3.

X. 78.4.

There is no reference to "spokes" anywhere else in the Rigveda. These references clearly indicate that spoked wheels (which were invented and used in the manufacture of spoked wheels at some point of time in the second half of the third millennium BCE, i.e. 2500-2200 BCE) were totally unknown to the Old Rigveda (Books 2-4, 6-7), and only became known during the period of composition of the New Rigveda (Books 1, 5, 8-10). This shows that the composition of the Old Rigveda goes back beyond the invention of spokes. Of course, one single word cannot prove anything, but my investigation into New Words started in the year 2001 following an internet debate on spoked wheels (between Witzel and Farmer on one side, and a group of NRIs on the other), it further led on to my analysis of the Mitanni name types and later the common Rigvedic-Avestan name types and words, and to my book "The Rigveda and the Avesta - The Final Evidence" (2008), followed by my article "the Chronological Gulf Between the Old Rigveda and the New Rigveda" (August 2020) and will now lead to my forthcoming article "The New Words and Other New Elements in the Rigveda". The combined effect of all this massive data shows that the Old Rigveda goes back beyond 2500 BCE, and it was composed in the region to the east of the Sarasvati river in modern Haryana.

The evidence that I have given (both textual and linguistic) has left the AIT academic lobby completely flabbergasted, and the only way it knows how to counter all the evidence is to completely stonewall it and to continue to write academic paper after academic paper in "peer-reviewed" journal after "peer-reviewed" journal simply reiterating what they have been writing before.

But there is a further "academic" development. It has now become necessary for them to start academic disinformation on a massive scale on crucial issues in order to try and sabotage the search for the Truth, by executing sharp u-turns to try to salvage the AIT. Thus, while the western academia has been claiming for over 200 years that the Rigvedic Sarasvati is identical with the Ghaggar-Hakra river-complex of Haryana: now suddenly all of western academia is on a campaign to stoutly reject this identification! A western academic scholar Johanna Nichols, who had written a deep linguistic study showing that the locus of the spread of Indo-European languages was from Bactria-Margiana to the west, has now been made to (reluctantly) recant from that position by way of a Stalin-era-style written confession accepting that she was wrong. Then a western scholar, W. E. Clark, in an academic paper, has tried to show that the Mitanni rulers had no Indo-Aryan connections at all.

Now here, Jamison has taken up the gauntlet to show that spoked wheels are not found mentioned only in the New Books, but are found mentioned all over the Rigveda!

In her book, Jamison correctly translates all the above references to ara as "spokes". But, wonder of wonders, she discovers that the Rigveda has plentful references not only to the above "spokes" but actually to "spoked wheels" themselves!!

The following are the verses in the Rigveda identified by Jamison as referring to "spoked wheels":

I.59.2;  128.6,8.

II.2.2,3;  4.2.

III.17.4.

IV.1.1;  2.1.

V.2.1.

VI.3.5; 7.1;  12.3;  15.4;  49.2.

VII.5.1;  10.3;  16.1.

VIII.19.1,21.

X.3.1,2,6,7;  61.20.

Now there has to be a word for her to translate as "spoked wheels". The word she chooses, above, is arati. [For some unknown reason, in five other references to arati,  I.58.7;  IV.38.4;  VI.67.8;  X.45.7;  46.4,  she makes no reference to spokes].

Now does this word mean "spoked wheels"? Note what two prominent western Sanskrit-English dictionaries have to say:

Monier Williams: "'moving quickly'; a servant, assistant, manager, administrator".

Cappeller: "1. assistant, minister, disposer. 2. discomfort, uneasiness".

Let us see how the other eminent western academic translators of the Rigveda have translated this word. For that we will take the first half of one of the above verses, I.59.2: mūrdhā divo nābhir agnih pṛthivyā athābhavad aratī rodasyoh.

Griffith: "The forehead of the sky, earth's center, Agni became the messenger of earth and heaven".

Wilson: "Agni the head of heaven, the navel of earth, became the ruler over both earth and heaven".

Grassmann: Des Himmels Haupt, der Erde Nabel, agni, ist beider Welten Diener er gewarden:

"The head of heaven, the navel of earth, Agni has become the servant of both worlds".

Geldner: Das Haupt des Himmels, der Nabel der Erde ist Agni, und er war der Lenker beider Welten:

"The head of heaven, the navel of the earth is Agni, and he was the ruler of both worlds".

Contrast this with Jamison's motivated mistranslation:

"The head of heaven the navel of the earth is Agni. And he became the spoked wheel of the two world-halves".

This one single, but very crucial, fraudulently mistranslated word by Jamison exposes the abysmally low and political nature of "peer-reviewed" western academic scholarship, which is held in such high, blind and worshipful reverence by many Indian sepoys in Indian academia and on the internet.

[In the course of many other articles, I have pointed out many more faults in the Jamison-Brereteon translations, particularly in respect of the identification of participants in the dāśarājña battle or other historically relevant matters.  But I will not go into them in detail here. this much should suffice here]